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ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Bernard H. 
Siegan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1981. Pp. 383. 
$19.50. 
It is now a commonplace that economic regulations often pro-
duce inefficiencies by interfering with the free play of market forces. 1 
But the Supreme Court has long applied a highly permissive stan-
dard in judging the constitutionality of these regulations: Due pro-
cess is violated only if the regulation is not rationally related to a 
legitimate state purpose. In the post-Lochner era, the Court has 
never invalidated economic legislation under this standard.2 
Bernard Siegan's3 Economic Liberties and the Constitution flatly 
rejects the Court's well-settled approach and calls for resurrection of 
substantive due process. His thesis, in short, is that since the framers 
of the Constitution "sought to perpetuate a system based on private 
property and private enterprise," the Court should "safeguard liber-
ties consistent with this objective" (p. 15). By failing to defend 
economic liberties, he argues, the Court has also abdicated its consti-
tutional obligation to protect individual rights. 
Because Siegan's thesis is revisionist, his task is difficult. To chal-
lenge the conventional wisdom successfully, a revisionist work must 
either present new evidence or demonstrate convincingly that the ac-
cepted doctrine is a flawed response to old arguments. Economic 
Liberties falls short on both counts and is unlikely to persuade read-
ers who think that the federal judiciary should not evaluate the de'-
sirability of state economic regulation. 
Siegan develops his argument in four steps. He first lays out his 
conception of the original meaning of due process. This meaning, he 
claims, "evolved not only from notions of reasonable governmental 
process but also from the natural law and social compact theories" 
(p. 26). After reviewing Blackstone, Cooke, Locke, and early 
Supreme Court decisions, Siegan concludes that "[p ]rotection of 
property and economic rights has been a dominant theme since the 
creation of the federal government" (p. 59). He finds in the prohibi-
tions of ex post facto laws4 and laws impairing the obligation of 
1. Siegan abstracts a litany of these studies. Pp. 283-303. 
2. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), invalidated a state statute governing the sale of 
money orders that excepted those issued by the American Express Company from regulation. 
The Court held the statute violative of equal protection. Morey was later overruled by City of 
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,306 (1976) (characterizing Morey as "needlessly intrusive 
judicial infringement on the State's legislative powers"). 
3. Siegan has authored or edited several books on related subjects. See LAND USE WITH-
OUT ZONING (1972); OTHER PEOPLE'S PROPERTY {1976); THE INTERACTION OF EcONOMICS 
AND THE LAW (1977); REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW (1979). 
4. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. 
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contracts5 ''very persuasive evidence . . . that the Constitution's 
Framers sought to safeguard property and economic interests from 
infringement" (p. 60), and laments the restrictive interpretation that 
these provisions have received. 
After establishing the importance of property and economic in-
terests, Siegan recalls, in painstaking detail, the halcyon days of sub-
stantive due process. 6 This discussion is intended to serve two 
purposes. First, it shows that the Court's decisions preserved per-
sonal property (pp. 128-32) and fostered competition by eliminating 
barriers to market entry (pp. 132-38). Siegan concludes that mini-
mum wages laws like that upheld in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish1 
may actually harm workers (p. 147), and argues that "the present 
court, were it ruling on the matter for the first time, probably would 
agree with the result" inAdkins v. Children's Hospital,8 a key case in 
the substantive due process era that West Coast Hotel overruled (p. 
146). 
Siegan also hopes to paint a better picture of the "old Court's" 
treatment of noneconomic personal liberties. An entire chapter de-
fends the Court's record in this area and concludes that "the substan-
tive due process judges adequately" protected personal rights (p. 
181). Relying primarily on the development of first amendment doc-
trine to support this conclusion (pp. 161-77), he ignores the Court's 
refusal to sustain reform legislation aimed at reducing or eliminating 
practices, like child labor, that most would consider an abuse of eco-
nomic liberty.9 Siegan's appraisal of the Court's handling of per-
sonal liberties during this era, therefore, will undoubtedly provoke 
disputes among legal scholars. 
Siegan then considers the standard that currently governs eco-
nomic regulation, a standard that asks only whether the legislation is 
rationally related to a legitimate state objective. He argues that the 
5. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10. 
6. This era is generally thought to have started in 1897 with Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 
U.S. 578 (1897), where the Court stated in dicta that citizens were "to be free in the enjoyment 
of all ... faculties, to be free to use them in all lawful ways ... to earn [a) livelihood by any 
lawful calling . . . and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, neces-
sary and essential .... " 165 U.S. at 589. The substantive due process era ended with the 
decision in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), where the Court upheld a statute 
regulating women's wages and stated that "[e)ven if the wisdom of the policy be regarded as 
debatable and its effects uncertain, still the legislature is entitled to its judgment." 300 U.S. at 
399. 
7. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
8. 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding that regulation of wages violated the due process clause of 
the fifth amendment). 
9. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (tax on goods produced with 
child labor not a valid exercise of taxing power); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) 
(prohibition of interstate shipment of goods produced with child labor outside scope of con-
gressional power under the commerce clause). 
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Carotene Products footnote10 rationale should be criticized for what 
it ignores - economic liberties - rather than praised for what it 
protects - the rights of discrete and insular minorities. The Court, 
in Siegan's opinion, has established a specious distinction between 
so-called fundamental rights11 and economic liberties. While Siegan 
correctly identifies the anomaly, he is not the first to do so12, and his 
treatment adds little to the current debate on how the Court should 
decide what rights or interests are sufficiently important to warrant 
heightened judicial scrutiny. 13 
The book's final section is both its best and worst. Siegan begins 
by elaborating on one part of the dichotomy that he previously iden-
tified. He points out that freedom of expression is afforded greater 
protection than freedom to engage in economic activity and finds 
this distinction intolerable. Here, Siegan must be credited for as-
tutely identifying a source of tension confronting the Supreme Court 
in its attempt to strike some balance between protected commercial 
and political speech. His choice of first amendment doctrine as a foil 
for his argument is particularly apt, given the Court's consistent use 
of marketplace metaphors to describe speech.14 
Siegan follows this comparison with the final elements of his ar-
gument. He asserts that the legislature is ill-suited to make socioeco-
nomic decisions because it often does not represent the will of the 
majority (p. 282), and that the process of legislating is often skewed 
by special interest groups. He also argues that most economic regu-
lation has produced inefficiency and reduced total welfare. 15 He 
concludes by proposing a stricter standard for review of economic 
regulation. Under Siegan's standard, courts would analyze a statute 
to determine whether its end was legitimate and whether its means 
10. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
11. Under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment, "Statutory classifications, which either imply suspect purposes 
or affect fundamental rights, will be held to deny equal protection unless necessary to further a 
compelling government interest." P. 205. 
12. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 59 (1980): 
Thus the list of values the Court and the commentators have tended to enshrine as 
fundamental is a list with which readers . . . will have little trouble identifying: expres-
sion, association, education, academic freedom, the privacy of the home, personal auton-
omy. . . . But watch most fundamental-rights theorists start edging toward the door 
when someone mentions jobs, food, or housing; those are important, sure, but they aren't 
fundamental. 
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
13. An excellent short summary of the current status of the debate is contained in Brest, 
17ze Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Nonnative Constitutional 
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981). 
14. Compare Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (striking down state statute prohibiting the advertising of generic drug 
prices), with Friedman v. Rogers, 435 U.S. 967 (1979) (upholding a Texas statute forbidding 
the use of trade names in optometrical advertising). 
15. See note 1 supra. 
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have substantially furthered that asserted end. He also proposes that 
the courts subject economic regulations to a least restrictive alterna-
tive requirement, striking down statutes that failed to use the means 
least restrictive of economic liberties to accomplish their ends. 
Some of the problems with this standard are obvious. First, Sie-
gan makes no attempt to square his proposed standard with his ad-
monition that the courts should avoid affirmative jurisprudence (p. 
105). If a court is the final arbiter of what constitutes the least re-
strictive means of accomplishing a given objective, an assertion that 
it is not legislating is merely semantic. Siegan's standard also lacks 
originality: it is but a minor variant of the standards that Justice 
Brennan and Professor Gunther would apply to economic regula-
tion.16 Finally, Siegan fails to address the problems that adoption of 
his standard might entail. How will the judiciary deal with the di-
lemmas that ultimately led to the demise of Lochner-like substantive 
due process? The reader is left to wonder why the passage of time 
and a few scattered studies suggesting that economic regulation is 
inefficient make revival of this standard appropriate. 
This unanswered question manifests the book's underlying weak-
ness: It is written like a brief, and too little space is devoted to ana-
lyzing competing arguments. This failing undercuts its thesis at 
every point. The pervasive effect of economic regulation in today's 
society compels close examination of the regulatory phenomenon, 
but Economic Liberties does not persuasively demonstrate that the 
courts should jettison close to a half-century of post-Lochner 
jurisprudence. 
16. Siegan concedes that Justice Brennan in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), 
required "scrutiny of the ends as well as the means" oflegislation. P. 324. Professor Gunther, 
like Siegan, would require that the legislation substantially further the state's objective in actu-
ality, rather than in mere conjecture. P. 323. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
.Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Mode/far a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I 
(1972). Siegan's major contribution, then, is the least restrictive alternative gloss. See pp. 322-
24. 
